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Labor Law, Antitrust Law, and Economics Professors’ Comment on the National 
Labor Relations Board’s Proposed Joint-Employer Rule 
 
January 14, 2019 
 
Submitted via www.regulations.gov 
 
John F. Ring, Chairman 
National Labor Relations Board 
1015 Half Street, SE 
Washington, D.C. 20570-0001 
 
Attn: Roxanne Rothschild, Associate Executive Secretary, NLRB 
 
Re: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), The Standard for Determining Joint-
Employer Status, 83 Fed. Reg. 46681 (Sept. 14, 2018), Docket Number: 2018-19930; RIN 
3142-AA13 
 
Dear Chairman Ring, 
 
We write as professors in the fields of labor law, antitrust law, and labor economics with 
extensive expertise in: (1) the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), National Labor 
Relations Board and judicial decisions as they pertain to joint employment; (2) the history 
and differential application of the antitrust laws to workers over employers; (3) antitrust 
law as it pertains to employer market power; (4) economic theory pertaining to employer 
market power and monopsonistic competition in labor markets; and/or (5) empirical 
economic research on labor market concentration and the impact of employer market 
power and monopsonistic competition on workers’ wages and terms and conditions of 
work. 
 
On September 14, 2018, the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”) published the 
Standard for Determining Joint-Employer Status Rule, proposing a new definition of “joint 
employers” (the “NPRM”). The NPRM proposed that an employer be considered a “joint 
employer” of a “separate employer’s employees only if the two employers share or 
codetermine the employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment, such as hiring, 
firing, discipline, supervision, and direction.” (p. 46686, col. 2, ¶1). The NPRM requires 
that a “putative joint employer must possess and actually exercise substantial direct and 
immediate control over the employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment in a 
manner that is not limited and routine.” (Id.).  
 
The NLRA capaciously defines “employer” to include “any person acting as an agent of 
an employer, directly or indirectly,” and “employee” to include “any employee, and shall 
not be limited to the employees of a particular employer.”1 Likewise, the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency’s definition of “servant” under Section 220(1) is broad, including 
anyone “employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the 
                                                        
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 151(2)-(3). 
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physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s control or right 
to control.”2 The rule proposed in this Comment is aimed at fulfilling the purposes of the 
NLRA and agency law principles in their expansive definitions of “employer” and 
“employee.” 
 
We recommend that the Board withdraw the proposed rule to let the existing Browning-
Ferris “joint employer” definition, recently affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit, stand,3 or, in the alternative, expand the definition of “joint employer” to 
explicitly include indirect employers with sufficient market power in the direct employer’s 
product market or the relevant labor market to determine workers’ wages and/or terms and 
conditions of work (“indirect employers”) under Section 2(2) of the NLRA. Evidence of 
existing labor market conditions and indirect employers’ collusion and coordination 
supports this recommendation. Broader workplace restructuring, increasing labor market 
concentration, employer market power in a range of industries, and employer wage-fixing, 
collusion, and use of anti-competitive agreements—no-poaching, non-compete, and 
others—allow indirect employers to determine the terms and conditions of work of other 
employers’ employees. At the very least, the Board should expand the definition of “joint 
employer” in its proposed rule to franchisors that include no-poaching, non-compete, and 
similar clauses in franchise agreements: such blatant restrictions on labor market 
competition that limit worker earnings, mobility and wage discovery should clearly require 
a finding of joint-employer status.4 
 
Indirect employers’ exploitation of their market power in labor markets has broader social 
welfare consequences resulting in: artificially suppressed wages, reduced hiring, decreased 
labor market dynamism, and broader labor market failures (Section 1). By failing to 
anticipate and assess the consequences of excluding such indirect employers, the Board 
has failed to engage in reasoned decision-making (Section 2). It has also failed to minimize 
any significant economic impact on small businesses and labor unions directly affected by 
abuses of indirect employers’ market power (Section 3). In doing so, the NPRM frustrates 
the NLRA’s purposes of ensuring: (1) equal bargaining power between employees and 
those who determine their wages and working conditions; and (2) competitive wage rates 
determined through bargaining between workers with “full freedom of association [and] 
actual liberty of contract” and “employers who are organized in the corporate or other 
forms of ownership association” (Section 4).5  Further, the NPRM conflicts with: (1) 
existing administrative law requirements of assessing the costs and benefits of its labor 
market regulation; and (2) Executive Order 13,725 (“Steps to Increase Competition and 
                                                        
2 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(l) (“A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs 
of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the 
other’s control or right to control.”). 
3 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 NLRB No. 186, at 2 (2015), aff’d in relevant part, Browning-
Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, No. 16-1028, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 36706 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 2018), 
defined “joint employers” of the same statutory employees as those who “share or codetermine those matters 
governing the essential terms and conditions of employment,” and did not require that a statutory employer’s 
control “be exercised directly and immediately”—“[i]f otherwise sufficient, control exercised indirectly—
such as through an intermediary—may establish joint-employer status.” 
4 See Alan B. Krueger & Orley C. Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise 
Sector (NBER Working Paper No. 24831, July 2018), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/ w24831. 
5 National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
 3 
Better Inform Consumers and Workers to Support Continued Growth of the American 
Economy”), which requires agencies to use their authorities to promote competitive labor 
markets (Section 5). Thus, we recommend that the Board withdraw its NPRM or expand 
its definition of “joint employers” to include indirect employers with sufficient market 
power to determine the wages and working conditions of other employers’ employees 
(Section 6). Either alternative would fulfill the NLRA’s purposes (Section 7) and would 
not conflict with existing federal law and rules (Section 8). 
 
1. Labor market concentration, increased employer market power, and 
anticompetitive conduct allows indirect employers to engage in wage-setting 
of other employers’ employees. 
 
Through workplace “fissuring” and employment restructuring, firms have outsourced 
employment in a range of contractual arrangements for labor inputs: franchising, 
subcontracting, and other supply-chain agreements.6 This restructuring more easily allows 
indirect employers to convert traditional wage-setting that would have occurred internal to 
their firms to contractual pricing arrangements—containing direct and indirect 
mechanisms of control and supervision—with other, direct employers. 7  One of the 
consequences of this shift is that indirect employers can use contractual arrangements to 
more easily engage in “wage discrimination” by removing pay for labor inputs from in-
firm, single-wage policies constrained by internal labor market wage-setting (determined 
by seniority-based pay, internal equity, and other constraints) into pricing for labor inputs 
on the external market.8 This reduces indirect employers’ labor costs. First, as increasing 
empirical evidence shows, indirect employees suffer wage penalties resulting from indirect 
employers’ contractual wage-setting for labor inputs.9 Second, indirect employers have 
shifted liability for social insurance benefits (unemployment insurance, workers’ 
compensation premiums) and private benefits (insurance, retirement) to direct employers 
while retaining the benefit of the labor inputs those other employers provide at lower 
rates.10 Third, indirect employers reduce labor costs by minimizing exposure to liability 
from workplace injuries, illnesses and fatalities as well as for discrimination, harassment 
                                                        
6 See generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE 93-177 (2014).  
7 Id. at 76-77. 
8 WEIL, supra note 6, at 40-41, 87-88. See also Deborah Goldschmidt & Johannes F. Schmieder, The Rise of 
Domestic Outsourcing and the Evolution of the German Wage Structure, 132 Q. J. ECON. 1165, 1165-1217 
(2017); Arindrajit Dube & Ethan Kaplan, Does Outsourcing Reduce Wages in the Low-Wage Service 
Occupations? Evidence from Janitors and Guards, 63 INDUS. LAB. REL. REV. 287 (2010) (finding a “wage 
penalty” of four to seven percent for janitors working as contractors as opposed to working directly for an 
employer); Samuel Berlinski, Wages and Contracting Out: Does the Law of One Price Hold?, 46 BRIT. J. 
INDUS. REL. 59 (2008) (finding that janitors who worked as contractors earned fifteen percent less than those 
working in-house). 
9 See, e.g., Goldschmidt & Schmieder, supra note 8; Berlinksi, supra note 8; Dube & Kaplan, supra note 8; 
Matthew Dey, Susan Houseman & Ann Polivka, What Do We Know About Contracting Out in the United 
States? Evidence from Household and Establishment Surveys, in LABOR IN THE NEW ECONOMY 267-304 (eds. 
Katherine G. Abraham, James R. Speltzer & Michael Harper, 2010); Katherine G. Abraham & Susan K. 
Taylor, Firms’ Use of Outside Contractors: Theory and Evidence, 14 J. LAB. ECON. 394, 394-424 (1996). 
10 WEIL, supra note 6, at 77.  
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and unjust dismissal. 11  Fourth, indirect employers can avoid costs associated with 
unionization and compliance with the NLRA with regard to non-union workforces due to 
the National Labor Relations Board’s failure to recognize most indirect employers as 
“employers” under the NLRA. 12  These avoided costs include those associated with 
administering collective bargaining agreements as well as overall lower pricing for labor 
inputs set at a non-union premium wage.13 These effects of workplace fissuring allow firms 
to exploit market power they already have as a result of exogenous shocks to and inherent 
frictions within the labor market. 14  And they can reduce these costs without losing 
substantial indirect control and supervision over the provision of labor inputs.  
 
In addition to workplace “fissuring” and employment restructuring, indirect employers 
exploit changes in labor market conditions, engage in labor market abuses to artificially 
suppress wages for labor inputs, and use wage-setting contractual arrangements to 
determine direct employers’ labor costs, thus directly impacting those employers’ costs and 
revenue. Labor market concentration, increased indirect employer market power, and 
evidence of employer collusion through wage-fixing, no-poaching, non-compete, and other 
types of indirect-direct employer arrangements allow indirect employers to engage in 
wage-setting that reduces workers’ wages.  
 
Labor Market Concentration. Increased labor market concentration facilitates indirect 
employers ability to engage in wage-setting for labor inputs. 15  Rising corporate 
                                                        
11 WEIL, supra note 6, at 78; DAVID MICHAELS, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. (“OSHA”), 
ADDING INEQUALITY TO INJURY: THE COSTS OF FAILING TO PROTECT WORKERS ON THE JOB 11 (June 2015), 
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/inequality_michaels_june2015.pdf. 
12 See, generally, Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment Relationship, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1527, 
1528-30 (1996). 
13 See, e.g., id. Indirect employers’ market power can prevent pass-on of the costs of other employers’ union 
premium wage or can exert direct or indirect pressure on other employers to avoid or suppress unionization.  
14 For a broader discussion of monopsony as “the best simple model to describe the decision problem 
facing an individual employer,” see ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION: IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN 
LABOR MARKETS 1-27 (2003); JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933); 
Lloyd G. Reynolds, The Supply of Labor to the Firm, 60 Q. J. ECON. 390, 390-411 (1946). Important labor 
market frictions include labor market fragmentation, search frictions, job differentiation, lock-in effects, 
and worker development of firm-specific skills. For literature discussing these labor market frictions, see, 
e.g., id.; David E. Card, Ana Rute Cardoso, Jeorg Heining & Patrick Kline, Firms and Labor Market 
Inequality: Evidence and Some Theory, 36 J. LAB. ECON. S13 (2018); Eduardo M. Azevedo, Imperfect 
Competition in Two-Sided Matching Markets, 83 GAMES & ECON. BEHAVIOR 207, 207-223(2014); Pierre 
Cahuc, Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job Search: Theory and 
Evidence, 74 ECONOMETRICA 323, 364 (2006); Richard Rogerson, Robert Shimer & Randall Wright, 
Search-theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey, 43 J. ECON. LIT. 959, 959-88 (2005); Kenneth 
Burdett & Dale Mortensen, Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment, 39 INT’L ECON. REV. 
257, 257-73 (1998); Kenneth Burdett, A Theory of Employee Job Search and Quit Rates, 68 AMER. ECON. 
REV. 212, 212-220 (1978); J.J. McCall, Economics of Information and Job Search, 84 Q J. ECON. 113, 133-
26 (1970); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 213-225 (1961).  
15 For empirical evidence of the impact of increased labor market concentration on wages, see, e.g., Kevin 
Rinz, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Labor Market Concentration, Earnings Inequality, and Earnings Mobility 
(CARRA Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2018-10, 2018); Brad Hershbein & Claudia Macaluso, 
Labor Market Concentration and the Demand for Skills (Working Paper, July 30, 2018), available at 
http://conference.iza.org/conference_files/DATA_2018/macaluso_c26795.pdf; Brad Hershbein, Claudia 
Macaluso & Chen Yeh, Concentration in U.S. Labor Markets: Evidence From Vacancy and Employment 
Data (Working Paper, 2018), available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/jsvohr58igf4813/ 
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concentration can impact labor markets by expanding each individual firm’s market power, 
facilitating collusion, and increasing barriers to entry.16 Labor market dynamism, or the 
frequency of changes in who is working for whom, has also been in a pattern of long-term 
decline, suggesting that incumbents are shielded from competitive upward pressure on 
wages and an increase in job-switching costs for non-contingent or non-temporary 
workers.17 In a number of industries, companies indirectly contracting for labor inputs—
lead companies—operate in more concentrated markets than the direct employer-
companies they contract.18 Industries with larger increases in concentration exhibit a larger 
decline in labor’s share of GDP, and the small number of “superstar” firms like Apple, 
Microsoft, and Google exhibit lower labor share than non-“superstar” firms. 19 
Concentration has meant that not only are workers ultimately supplying their labor inputs 
to a smaller number of end-user employers but also that intermediary firms that directly 
employ labor inputs are being squeezed by a smaller number of firms with whom they 
contract for the provision of labor services.20 
 
Increased Employer Market Power. Indirect employers can engage in wage-setting for 
labor inputs from direct employers based on their exercise of market power over those 
employers. In a truly competitive labor market in an economic sense, firms hiring or 
contracting for labor inputs face a flat supply curve.21 If a firm bids too low for labor inputs, 
workers would find alternative employment, so competitive firms would all need to pay 
market wages and compensation would equalize across similarly productive workers for 
                                                        
HMY_concentration.pdf?dl=0; Efraim Benmelech, Nittai Bergman, & Hyunseob Kim, Strong Employers 
and Weak Employees: How Does Employer Concentration Affect Wages? (NBER Working Paper No. 24307, 
Jan. 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24307; Peter C. Fisk, Study Measures Effect of Labor Market 
Concentration on Wages, Monthly Labor Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics (July 2018), available at 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2018/beyond-bls/study-measures-effect-of-labor-market-concentration-on-
wages.htm; José Azar, Ioana Marinescu, Marshall Steinbaum, & Bledi Taska, Concentration in U.S. Labor 
Markets: Evidence from Online Vacancy Data (NBER Working Paper No. 24395, 2018); José Azar, Ioana 
Marinescu & Marshall Steinbaum, Labor Market Concentration (NBER Working Paper No. 24147, 2017); 
Douglas Webber, Firm Market Power and the Earnings Distribution, 35 LAB. ECON. 123, 123-134 (2015). 
16  COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, LABOR MARKET MONOPSONY: TRENDS, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY 
RESPONSES 2-4 (Oct. 2016) [hereinafter CEA I], 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20161025_monopsony_labor_ 
mrkt_cea.pdf; Azar et al., supra note 13 (showing that going from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile 
in concentration is associated with a 15-25% decline in posted wages, suggesting that concentration increases 
labor market power); Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market 
Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536 (2018); see also supra note 8 (collecting literature on wage penalties in 
fissured labor markets). 
17  Id. at 10–12; Raven Molloy et al., Understanding Declining Fluidity in the U.S. Labor Market, in 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 183, 183–88 (2016); Henry Hyatt & James Spletzer, The Shifting 
Job Tenure Distribution, 41 LAB. ECON. 363, 363-77 (2016); Steven J. Davis & John Haltiwanger, Labor 
Market Fluidity and Economic Performance 1–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20479, 
2014). 
18 David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson & John Van Reenen, Concentrating on 
the Fall of the Labor Share, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 180, 180-186 (2017); Matthew Kehrig & Nicolas Vincent, 
Growing Productivity without Growing Wages: The Micro-Level Anatomy of the Aggregate Labor Share 
Decline, CESifo Working Paper Series 6454 (2017). 
19 Id. 
20 WEIL, supra note 6, at 79-92. 
21 MANNING, supra note 14, at 29-32. 
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similar types of jobs.22 But there is an emerging consensus within the economic literature 
that labor markets are naturally monopsonistically competitive, meaning that due to a range 
of exogenous factors and labor market frictions, most firms face upward-sloping labor 
supply curves.23 Indirect employers can enhance their market power over labor inputs 
through a range of contractual and other mechanisms, whether in direct contracting for 
labor or indirect contracting with intermediary firms for labor inputs, which means that 
they will hire less labor and pay lower wages than the otherwise equivalent employer facing 
less elastic supply curves.24  Empirical work in labor economics has demonstrated the 
impact of employers’ labor market power on wage suppression.25 Indirect employers with 
market power are incentivized to maximize their profits by contracting for fewer workers 
at lower wages than they would in a competitive labor market. This is profit-maximizing 
because what they lose in reduced output and revenue they can more than make up for in 
reduced labor costs by contracting for labor inputs at lower wages. 26  These indirect 
employers can thus recoup labor and recruitment costs, shifting the benefits of production 
from wages to profits, while intermediary direct employers and their direct employees 
suffer the losses in terms of reduced hiring and suppressed wages. This reduction in the 
amount of labor purchased not only harms direct employers and employees, but also leads 
to deadweight loss to our country’s output. 
 
Thus, indirect employers with enhanced market power—whether as a result of labor market 
concentration, unlawful acquisition or maintenance of monopsony power, indirect 
employer collusion, or labor market failures resulting from search frictions and information 
asymmetries that produce wage penalties on contracted-for labor in the fissured 
workplace—have the ability to pay lower prices for labor inputs without losing direct 
employer sellers (franchisees, subcontractors, or other labor input suppliers) to competition 
from other firms contracting for the same or similar labor inputs.27  
 
Employers’ increased market power is traceable not only to increased labor market 
concentration but also to a range of labor market failures that workplace restructuring has 
                                                        
22 Id. at 29-32. 
23 See supra note 13; Suresh Naidu & Eric A. Posner, Labor Monopsony and the Limits of Law (Working 
Paper, Oct. 14, 2018), available at https://irs.princeton.edu/sites/irs/files/naidu%20posner%20 
limits%20of%20law%20conference%20draft.pdf. 
24 For standard accounts of the definition and effects of employer monopsony and oligopsony power, see 
MANNING, supra note 14; Orley Ashenfelter, Henry Farber & Michael Ransom, Labor Market Monopsony, 
28 J. LAB. ECON. 203, 203-10 (2010). 
25 See, e.g., Arindrajit Dube, Jeff Jacobs, Suresh Naidu & Siddharth Suri, Monopsony in Online Labor 
Markets (NBER Working Paper No. 24416, March 2018); David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, 
Christina Patterson & John Van Reenen, The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms (IZA 
Inst. Lab. Econ., Discussion Paper No. 10756); Card et al., Firms and Labor Market Inequality, supra note 
14; Jordan D. Matsudaira, Monopsony in the Low-Wage Labor Market? Evidence from Minimum Nurse 
Staffing Regulations, 96 REVIEW ECON. STAT. 92 (2013); Michael R. Ransom and David P. Sims. Estimating 
the Firm’s Labor Supply Curve in a ‘New Monopsony’ Framework: Schoolteachers in Missouri, 28 J. LAB. 
ECON. 331 (2010); Douglas O. Staiger, Joanne Spetz, & Ciaran S. Phibbs, Is There Monopsony in the Labor 
Market? Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” 28 J. LAB. ECON. 211 (2010). 
26 CEA I, supra note 16, at 2-4. 
27 See generally 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 575 (3d ed. 2007); 
ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 1–2 (2010); MANNING, 
supra note 14, at 1–2. 
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increased, including two-sided and multi-sided differentiation in labor markets, increased 
search frictions, and decreased wage transparency.28 Workplace restructuring has meant 
that labor markets are multiply differentiated by the idiosyncratic preferences of workers 
choosing employers as well as indirect employers’ preferences for direct employers, who 
then have their own preferences for workers, creating heightened matching frictions.29 The 
proliferation of intermediary firms increases the costs on workers in both time and effort 
to find employment, and because “a worker’s existing employer knows that the worker’s 
search cost is high, the employer can reduce compensation—including wages, benefits, and 
workplace amenities—or fail to increase compensation despite the worker’s contributions 
because the employer knows that the worker can find an alternative job only with 
difficulty.”30 It also increases the problem of asymmetric information because it is more 
difficult for workers to discover competing wages or utilize internal labor market 
mechanisms to gauge wage differentials under horizontal or vertical pay equity structures 
internal to a single firm.31 Historically low union density in the private sector and the 
decline of the real value of the federal minimum wage since its peak of $9.55 (in 2015 
dollars) in 1968 reduce the checks on employer wage-setting, whether they be direct 
employers setting wages or indirect employers contracting for labor inputs.32 
 
Employer Collusion. Labor market fissuring and labor market concentration has also 
facilitated collusive conduct by employers in the form of employers’ unilateral conduct as 
well as wage-fixing, non-compete, and no-poaching agreements, resulting in abuses in the 
exercise of employer market power and wage suppression. Unlawful collusion to 
unreasonably restrain labor market competition benefit employers by allowing them to 
artificially suppress wages. 33  As the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division 
(“Antitrust Division”) has said, “Robbing employees of labor market competition deprives 
them of job opportunities, information, and the ability to use competing offers to negotiate 
better terms of employment.”34 Employer collusion has been particularly widespread in the 
context of franchising: 58 percent of major franchisors’ contracts include “no-poaching-
                                                        
28 See Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 16. For an explanation of two-sided differentiation in labor markets, 
see, e.g., ALVIN E. ROTH & M. SOTOMAYOR, TWO-SIDED MATCHING: A STUDY IN GAME-THEORETIC 
MODELING AND ANALYSIS (1990); D. Gale & Lloyd S. Shapley, College Admissions and the Stability of 
Marriage, 69 AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY 9 (1962). 
29 For fuller discussion of differentiation in labor markets, see Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note 16, at 541. 
30 Id. at 13. 
31 WEIL, supra note 6, at 80; Hiba Hafiz, Picketing in the New Economy, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1893 
(2018). For information asymmetries in labor markets generally, see  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the 
Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 460 (2002). 
32 CEA I, supra note 16, at 12-13; News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2016 (Jan. 
26, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01262017.pdf; Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra 
note 16, at 542, 552. For a recent empirical study of the impact of low unionization rates on increasing 
employee bargaining power to diminish employers’ ability to lower wages in concentrated labor markets, see 
Benmelech, Bergman & Kim, supra note 15, at 4-5, 15-19. 
33 See, e.g., DOJ ANTITRUST DIV. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE 
PROFESSIONALS (Oct. 2016). 
34 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No More No-Poach: The Antitrust Division Continues to Investigate 




of-workers agreements,”35 and an estimated eighteen percent of the U.S. labor force is 
covered by non-compete agreements based on recent survey evidence.36 The Antitrust 
Division has thus taken an aggressive stance that it intends to proceed criminally against 
naked no-poaching and wage-fixing agreements. 37  In addition to these criminal 
enforcement actions, the Antitrust Division and class action litigants have filed civil cases 
against a range of employers for anticompetitive conduct in labor markets, including major 
Silicon Valley employers, hospitals, sports associations, fast-food franchisors and 
franchisees, to name a few, for artificially suppressing the wages of high-tech employees, 
nurses, mixed martial arts fighters, low-wage workers and others, through unlawful 
monopsony acquisition and maintenance, collusive wage-setting, no-poaching agreements, 
and non-compete agreements.38 In the high-tech employees example, defendants Adobe, 
Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, Pixar, Lucasfilm and eBay colluded to prevent competition 
among their workers by agreeing not to cold-call each other’s employees, impacting over 
64,000 workers and resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in settlements.39  But 
employers in these antitrust actions have also sought antitrust immunity under “single 
entity” or “integrated enterprise” doctrine, seeking to be recognized as a single employer 
                                                        
35 Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 4, at 4, 6, 24. 
36 OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, NONCOMPETE CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 6 (Mar. 2016). For prevalence of non-compete agreements, see also ALAN KRUEGER 
& ERIC A. POSNER, A PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING LOW-INCOME WORKERS FROM MONOPSONY AND 
COLLUSION (Hamilton Project, Feb. 27, 2018), available at 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_income_workers_from_monopsony_collusion_
krueger_posner_pp.pdf; Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman D. Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor 
Force (U. of Michigan Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 18-013, Sept. 13, 2018), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2625714&download=yes; Norman D. Bishara & Evan 
Starr, The Incomplete Noncompete Picture, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 497, 498–504 (2016). 
37 Id. 
38 See generally OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, NONCOMPETE CONTRACTS, supra note 
34, at 4, 11–12; Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 4; Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Justice Department Requires eBay to End Anticompetitive “No Poach” Hiring Agreements (May 1, 
2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-ebayend-anticompetitive-no-poach-
hiring-agreements; Sarah Cwiek, Detroit Medical Center Agrees to Settle with Nurses, End Long-Running 
Antitrust Lawsuit, MICH. RADIO (Sept. 14, 2015), http://michiganradio.org/post/detroit-medical-center-
agreessettle-nurses-end-long-running-antitrust-lawsuit; Lance Whitney, Apple, Google, Others Settle 
Antipoaching Lawsuit for $415 Million, CNET (Sept. 3, 2015, 8:32 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-
google-others-settle-anti-poaching-lawsuit-for-415-million; Seth Rosenblatt, Judge Approves First Payout 
in Antitrust Wage-Fixing Lawsuit, CNET (May 16, 2014, 3:51 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/judge-
approves-first-payout-in-antitrust-wage-fixing-lawsuit; Dave Jamieson, Jimmy John’s Makes Low-Wage 
Workers Sign “Oppressive” Noncompete Agreements, HUFFINGTON POST (2014), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/13/jimmy-johns-non-compete_n_5978180.html. Prevalence of 
non-compete agreements among workers unlikely to have trade secrets also evidences monopsony power; 
Roger D. Blair & Christina DePasquale, Monopsony and Countervailing Power in the Market for Nurses, 
ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., Dec. 2010, at 2, 
http://economics.emory.edu/home/documents/documents/Depasqualechristina_1.pdf; Press Release, Office 
of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Six High Tech Companies to Stop 
Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements (Sept. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Press Release, 
DOJ Requires Six High Tech Companies], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentrequires-six-
high-tech-companies-stop-entering-anticompetitive-employee; Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with the Arizona Hospital and Healthcare 
Association and Its Subsidiary (May 22, 2007), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/2007/223470.htm.  
39 Whitney, supra note 36. 
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for antitrust purposes even as they seek to avoid “employer” status under the labor and 
employment laws.40 
 
Employer collusion has allowed indirect employers to benefit from industry-wide wage 
suppression that, but for the collusion, could be remediated by workers negotiating for 
higher wages with direct employers. In other words, horizontal collusion allows employers 
to shift away from wage-negotiators to conspirator wage-setters determining the 
compensation rates of other employers’ employees through agreements with those 
employers. Such collusion makes indirect employers as determinative of workers’ wages 
and terms and conditions of employment as direct employers. Additionally, indirect 
employers can use vertical restraints in franchising and other supplier arrangements to 
artificially suppress wages through price-setting for direct employers’ labor inputs.41  
 
2. The joint-employer NPRM is not based on reasoned decision-making and fails 
to properly consider the value of taking no action or adopting a “joint-
employer” definition that includes indirect employers with sufficient market 
power as “joint employers.” 
 
The joint-employer NPRM is arbitrary and capricious in failing to analyze the relevant data 
on labor market concentration, increased employer market power, and collusion on 
defining who comes within the definition of joint employment. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n 
v. State Farm Auto Mutual Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The 
NLRB’s policy decisions must reflect the reasoned exercise of expert judgment, Burlington 
Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-68 (1962), and it is the NLRB’s “duty 
to consider responsible alternatives to its chosen policy and to give a reasoned explanation 
for its rejection of such alternatives,” particularly “where it admits . . . that the choice 
embraced suffers from noteworthy flaws.” Brookings Municipal Tel. Co. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 
1153, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Board admits that it did not cite “peer reviewed research 
demonstrating a causal connection between the Board’s current joint-employer standard 
and the national employment rate or the employment rate of any state or political 
subdivision” because the NLRA “prohibits the Board from hiring individuals to conduct 
the economic analysis members of Congress asked about.42 But the Board majority appears 
to invite anecdotal evidence submitted by employers while ignoring a crucial study, cited 
by dissenting Member McFerran, finding that 58% of major franchisors’ franchise 
agreements with franchisees include no-poaching clauses that limit worker earnings, 
mobility and wage discovery—a contractual restriction that should clearly warrant an 
expansion of “joint employer” status beyond the Board’s proposed NPRM.43 Beyond mere 
                                                        
40 See generally Prof. Sanjukta Paul et. al.’s Comment to The Standard for Determining Joint-Employer 
Status (Dec. 13, 2018). 
41  See, e.g., Brian Callaci, Vertical Power and the Creation of the Fissured Workplace: The Case of 
Franchising (2018) (analyzing 530 franchise contracts to show how vertical restraints allow franchisors to 
shift costs to subordinate firms; Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 4. 
42  Letter from Chairman John F. Ring to Reps. Patty Murray & Bobby Scott (Oct. 23, 2018), 
http://src.bna.com/CKF. 
43 See Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 4; Robert Iafolla, Anecdotal Evidence for “Joint Employment” 
Rule May Not Be Enough, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 15, 2018), available at 
https://www.bna.com/anecdotal-evidence-joint-n57982093879/ (quoting Chairman Ring as stating that he 
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reliance on anecdotal evidence, the Board must avail itself of this and other recent 
theoretical and empirical peer-reviewed research on labor markets and wage determination 
in this comment period. 
 
As an economic matter, “possess[ion] and actual[] exercise [of] substantial direct and 
immediate control over the employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment in a 
manner that is not limited and routine” (p. 46687, column 2, paragraph 2) (emphasis added) 
is irrelevant for actual wage determination when indirect employers with market power are 
wage-setters. By failing to consider and assess the extensive theoretical and empirical 
literature on the fissured workplace as well as the industrial organizations and labor 
economics literature on the impacts of indirect employer market power in wage-setting, the 
NLRB’s NPRM wrongly excludes as “joint employers” labor contracting parties that the 
social scientific literature has found in fact determine workers’ wages and working 
conditions, and the Board has done this without reasoned explanation. Portland Cement 
Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“It is not consonant with the 
purpose of a rule-making proceeding to promulgate rules on the basis of inadequate data, 
or on data that, to a critical degree, is known only to the agency.”). Board Member Lauren 
McFerran recognizes this in her dissenting view. See p. 46688, column 2, paragraph 1 
(“The majority cites no evidence of ‘continuing uncertainty in the labor-management 
community”); id. at footnote 17 (“To the extent that the majority is relying on anything 
other than anecdotal evidence of this alleged uncertainty, it is required to let the public 
know the evidentiary basis of its conclusion.”); id. at 46691, column 3, paragraph 4 (“The 
majority’s simplified examples . . . [do not] address issues of current concern implicating 
joint employment—such as, for example—the recent revelation that national fast-food 
chains have imposed ‘no poaching’ restrictions on their franchisees that limit the earnings 
and mobility of franchise employees . . . .”). 
 
3. The joint-employer NPRM fails to minimize any significant economic impact 
on small businesses and labor unions.  
 
The NLRB must consider “any significant alternatives to the proposed rule which 
accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes and which minimize any significant 
economic impact of the proposed rule on small entities,” including small businesses and 
small-entity labor unions. 5 U.S.C. § 603(c); 13 CFR 121.201. Relative to alternative joint-
employer standards, including the current Browning-Ferris joint-employer standard, the 
proposed NPRM: (1) dramatically limits workers’ ability to counteract employer 
monopsony and oligopsony power; and (2) fails to properly calculate the costs and 
inefficiencies that result to small businesses and labor unions from the exercise of such 
power: namely, artificial wage suppression and reduced hiring (or deadweight loss). The 
NLRB’s failure to reasonably assess more expansive definitions of “joint employers” that 
would include indirect employers with market power over workers’ wages and terms and 
conditions of work, as well as its failure to reasonably assess the alternative of taking no 
action and leaving the Browning-Ferris joint-employer standard in place, violates 5 U.S.C. 
§ 603(c). 
                                                        
foresees testimonials from businesses explaining their experiences with the current standard as part of the 
evidence supporting the proposed changes in the NPRM). 
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Significant Economic Impact on Small Businesses. The NLRB’s failure to incorporate 
indirect employers with market power over workers’ wages in its NPRM will harm small 
businesses more than the existing Browning-Ferris rule and/or alternative joint-employer 
standards. First, as a matter of economic theory, an indirect employer with market power 
over small businesses supplying contracted-for labor inputs faces an upward-sloping 
supply curve, and it is profitable for that indirect employer to reduce and artificially 
suppress payment for labor inputs from those businesses.44 Further, by shifting labor costs 
and liabilities to smaller business entities or third-party labor intermediaries, indirect 
employers increase small businesses’ costs.45 This decreases intermediary direct employers’ 
profitability and confers rents to indirect employer purchasers of labor inputs.46 As David 
Weil has explained, “conditions at the secondary level (and below) are frequently tough: 
competitive, price sensitive, and subject to fluctuating demand.”47 High insolvency and 
turnover rates of small businesses are the direct result of franchisor market power 
artificially suppressing workers’ wages downstream while profitably extracting rents from 
their labor: “Since the franchisor receives payment from royalties linked to revenues but 
does not face the direct costs of employing workers . . ., it can still earn reasonable returns 
even given tough market conditions and downward pricing pressure.”48 
 
The estimated costs described in Section V.A and V.B., pp. 46692-94, of the NPRM thus 
fail to consider the real costs of the NPRM on small businesses. NLRB is required in its 
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (“IRFA”) under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 
1980 (“RFA”), 5 U.S.C. 601, et seq. to “develop alternatives wherever possible, when 
drafting regulations that will have a significant impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.” (pp. 46692-46693). While the Board stated that it “believes that this rule will 
likely not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities” (p. 46693, 
column 1, paragraph 3), it has not substantiated this belief with any evidence. In fact, the 
Board admits that it “does not have the means to identify precisely how many businesses 
are impacted by contracting and subcontracting within the U.S., or how many contractors 
and subcontractors would be small businesses as defined by the SBA” (p. 46694, column 
1, paragraph 2), and that it “does not have the means to identify precisely how many 
franchisees operate within the U.S., or how many are small businesses as defined by the 
SBA” (p. 46694, column 2, paragraph 3).  
 
Instead of reviewing the existing and robust empirical evidence of workplace fissuring on 
small businesses, the Board looked only to the frequency with which the “joint-employer” 
issue presented itself to the Board as evidence of impact on small business. The Board’s 
determination that “approximately 0.028% of all 5.9 million business firms” (p. 46693, 
column 3, paragraph 2), or 165,200, are affected based on its case load defies figures 
presented in social scientific studies. Those studies estimate the number of small entities 
                                                        
44  For an explanation of the economic theory supporting monopsonistic and oligopsonistic pricing, see 
generally MANNING, supra note 14, at 29-52. 
45 Weil, Enforcing Labor Standards in Fissured Workplaces, at 37. 
46 WEIL, supra note 6, at 88-90. 
47 Id. at 100. See also Dilip Mookherjee & Masatoshi Tsumagari, The Organization of Supplier Networks: 
Effects of Delegation and Intermediation, 72 ECONOMETRICA 1179, 1179-1219 (2004). 
48 WEIL, supra note 6, at 139-42 
 12 
bound up in supply-chain and contracting relationships that involve wage-setting by 
indirect employers with market power over small businesses at a much higher rate—in the 
franchising context alone, 58% of franchisor contracts contain “no-poaching-of-workers 
agreements.”49 The Board’s claim that “employers will only be directly impacted” by the 
NPRM “when they are alleged to be a joint employer in a Board proceeding” (p. 46695, 
column 1, paragraph 1) defies basic principles of economics: (1) it ignores that businesses 
will structure their transactions based in part on legal costs of compliance; and (2) 
overlooks that, where employers with market power can artificially suppress remuneration 
for work, workers and small businesses bear the costs entirely, regardless of whether they 
present representation petitions and unfair labor practices against indirect employers before 
the National Labor Relations Board. The Board’s cursory calculation also defies the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act’s requirements, which impose obligations on the Board to 
determine how its rulemaking will impact future employers. See Mid-Tex Elec. Co-op v. 
FERC, 773 F.2d 327, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[I]t is clear that Congress envisioned that the 
relevant ‘economic impact’ was the impact of compliance with the proposed rule on 
regulated small entities.”).  
 
The Board has thus not considered the ways in which the exercise of indirect employer 
market power and collusion within supply chains, franchise arrangements, or other 
contracting arrangements compels small, intermediary employers to artificially suppress 
workers’ wages while allowing contracting parties to collect the rents. This harms small 
businesses in two ways: (1) it limits their ability to hire workers and grow; and (2) it 
extracts profits that small, intermediary employers would have collected but for their being 
compelled to pass it on to contracting parties that have market power over their sale of 
labor services.  
 
With no empirical evidence cited to support its assertions, the Board states: “We conclude 
that the proposed rule imposes . . . no lost sales and profits resulting from the proposed 
rule; no changes in market competition as a result of the proposed rule and its impact on 
small entities or specific submarkets of small entities; and no costs of hiring employees 
dedicated to compliance with regulatory requirements” (p. 46695, column 1, paragraph 2). 
The Board continues: “fewer employers may be alleged as joint employers, resulting in 
lower costs to some small entities. The Board is without the means to quantify such costs 
and welcomes any comment or data on this topic” (p. 46695, column 2, paragraph 1). But 
while the RFA requires agencies to provide “either a quantifiable or numerical description 
of the effects of a proposed rule or alternatives to a proposed rule,” the Board does not 
justify why it opts for the RFA’s third option, “more general descriptive statements” due 
to quantification neither being “practicable or reliable” (p. 46695, column 2, footnote 71 
(citing 5 U.S.C. 607)) (emphasis added).  
 
In fact, there is considerable data on, for example, the impact of employer collusion on 
franchisees, as cited above as well as by Member Lauren McFerran at p. 46692, column 1, 
footnote 40 (citing Alan B. Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, “Theory and Evidence on 
Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector,” Princeton University Working Paper No. 614 
(Sept. 28, 2017), available at http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp014f16c547g), to 
                                                        
49 Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 4. 
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name just one. There is increasing empirical evidence that small businesses are harmed as 
a result of indirect employer market power by being squeezed of revenues, pushed into 
accepting lower and lower margins, and going bankrupt in a range of supply-chain 
arrangements, and particularly in franchising arrangements. Franchising contracts utilize 
vertical restraints that allow indirect employer franchisors to shift costs to direct employer 
firms.50 For example, franchising in the janitorial services sector indicates high annual 
turnover rates of 15% from franchisees exiting the industry. 51  Indirect franchisor 
employers’ use of no-poaching and non-compete agreements enable direct franchisee 
employers to pay artificially suppressed wage rates while reducing turnover, facilitating a 
“low-wage strategy.”52 Evidence thus suggests that, if workers are able to collectively 
bargain with both direct employers and indirect employers that have market power over 
their direct employer, they could mitigate rents indirect employers reap at the expense of 
both themselves and their direct employers by negotiating their wages up above artificially 
suppressed rates.  
 
Due to these costs, the rule may well contribute to small business insolvency, a key 
criterion under the Small Business Administration Guide, and there is strong reason to 
believe that, in light of the theoretical discussion and empirical evidence cited above, the 
cost of the proposed regulation will: “(a) eliminate more than 10 percent of the businesses’ 
profits; (b) exceed one percent of the gross revenues of the entities in a particular sector; 
or (c) exceed five percent of the labor costs of the entities in the sector” (p. 46695, column 
3, paragraph 3 (citing SBA Guide at 19)). The Board lists this criterion as a necessary 
consideration on p. 46695, column 3, paragraph 2, but fails to review or consider any 
relevant data. 
 
Significant Economic Impact on Labor Unions. The NPRM also fails to properly 
consider its impact on small-entity labor unions, concluding, without providing a monetary 
or cost estimate of its impact, that “the proposed rule impacts labor unions generally,” (see 
p. 46693, column 1, paragraph 3; p. 46694, column 3, paragraph 2), even though it 
calculates that 97.6% of total labor union firms are small businesses (p. 46694, column 3, 
paragraph 2). The Board’s failure to cite empirical evidence and failure to properly 
calculate the costs of the NPRM on labor unions violates 5 U.S.C. § 603(c). As discussed 
above, indirect employers’ exercise of market power on direct employers leads to reduced 
employment and suppressed worker pay. Both effects reduce worker contributions to labor 
unions in the form of union dues, which are calculated as a percentage of gross pay.53 In 
fact, a leading non-profit think tank, the Economic Policy Institute, conservatively 
                                                        
50 See Brian Callaci, Vertical Power and the Creation of a Fissured Workplace: The Case of Franchising, 
(Sept. 5, 2018), available at https://briancallaci.files.wordpress.com/2018/12/callaci_jmp_november.pdf. 
51 WEIL, supra note 4, at 141. 
52 Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 4. 
53 See, e.g., Ben Casselman, Closer Look at Union vs. Nonunion Workers’ Wages, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 
2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2012/12/17/closer-look-atunion-vs-nonunion-workers-wages 
(estimating average agency fees at 2% of wages and full union dues at approximately 3% of wages). 
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estimates that, if the proposed rule is finalized, the cost to workers would be a transfer of 
$1.3 billion to employers in the form of lost earnings below a union wage.54 
 
4. The joint-employer NPRM frustrates the NLRA’s purposes.  
 
The joint employer NPRM also frustrates the purposes of the NLRA as stated in Section 1 
of the Act: ensuring equal bargaining power between employees and employers, and 
stabilizing competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries 
determined through bargaining between workers with “full freedom of association [and] 
actual liberty of contract” and “employers who are organized in the corporate or other 
forms of ownership association.” 29 U.S.C. § 151; see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937) (describing the “reason for labor organizations” as 
“essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer”). Failing 
to incorporate indirect employers with market power to determine workers’ wages and 
working conditions prevents equal bargaining power between employees and the indirect 
employers because it allows those indirect employers to engage in wage-setting, 
“organized in the corporate form,” without facing any countervailing power by workers or 
legal obligations to collectively bargain.55  
 
Further, failing to evaluate the microeconomic effects of its proposed NPRM and existing 
or alternative joint employer definitions obviates the NLRA’s purpose of stabilizing 
competitive wage rates, ignoring how its definitional parameters of joint employment can 
limit workers’ ability to negotiate up artificially suppressed wages with those who 
                                                        
54 Comment, Economic Policy Institute, The Standard for Determining Joint-Employer Status (Dec. 10, 
2018), at 4, available at https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comments-regarding-the-standard-for-
determining-joint-employer-status/. 
55 See generally WEIL, supra note 6, at 7–27 (collecting empirical literature on the decline in workers’ real 
wages, benefits, employment security, and ability to voice concerns in a “fissured” workplace); see also 
LABOR IN THE NEW ECONOMY (Katharine G. Abraham et al. eds., 2010) (collecting essays by leading 
economists on the effects of corporate restructuring on earning inequality, benefits, job security, work hours, 
and workplace health and safety); MARK BARENBERG, ROOSEVELT INST., WIDENING THE SCOPE OF WORKER 
ORGANIZING: LEGAL REFORMS TO FACILITATE MULTI-EMPLOYER ORGANIZING, BARGAINING, AND STRIKING 
1–10 (Oct. 7, 2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Widening-the-Scope-of-
Worker-Organizing.pdf (discussing the diminution of labor’s bargaining power under corporate 
restructuring); ANNETTE BERNHARDT, ROOSEVELT INST., THE ROLE OF LABOR MARKET REGULATION IN 
REBUILDING ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE U.S. 1–13 (Mar. 25, 2014) (arguing for strengthened labor 
regulation due to growing employer evasion of legal responsibility under new corporate structures); Harry C. 
Katz, United States: The Spread of Coordination and Decentralization Without National-Level 
Tripartism, in THE NEW STRUCTURE OF LABOR RELATIONS: TRIPARTISM AND DECENTRALIZATION 
192, 192–212 (Harry C. Katz, et al. eds., 2004) (discussing effects of decentralized collective bargaining on 
worker bargaining power in the United States); Kate Andrias, New Labor Law, YALE L.J. ___, 13–31 
(discussing the relationship between economic restructuring and the decline of worker influence in their 
workplaces and in policy-making at the state and federal levels); Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the 
Employment Relation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1527 (1996) (describing the transition and evolution of employment 
relationships with the decline of the manufacturing sector and the rise of the service sector). 
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determine their wages.56 Efficient bargains in the workplace can also reduce labor unrest.57 
Specifically, failing to incorporate indirect employers with market power over direct 
employers’ labor inputs frustrates the “practice and procedure of collective bargaining,” 29 
U.S.C. § 151, because, under the Board’s own justification for regulating joint employment 
in the first instance, “[w]here collective bargaining under the law is not an option, workers 
have no choice but to use other means to improve their terms and conditions of employment. 
Economic pressure predictably will be directed at the business entities that control a 
workplace, whether or not the Board recognizes them as employers.” (p. 46690, column 2, 
paragraph 3). Moreover, “reduc[ing] opportunities for collective bargaining . . . effectively 
shortens the reach of the act” (p. 46689, column 1, paragraph 1).58  
 
5. The joint-employer NPRM conflicts with existing federal law and rules. 
 
In Section V.D of the NPRM, the Board states that it “has not identified any federal rules 
that conflict with the proposed rule,” and it “welcomes comments that suggest any potential 
conflicts not noted in this section” (p. 46695, column 3, paragraph 5). As discussed below, 
the proposed rule conflicts with: (1) administrative law requirements for cost-benefit 
analysis; and (2) Executive Order 13,725 (“Steps to Increase Competition and Better 
Inform Consumers and Workers to Support Continued Growth of the American Economy”), 
which requires agencies to use their authorities to promote competitive labor markets.59 
 
Administrative Law. The Supreme Court and federal courts of appeal, when reviewing 
rulemakings of independent regulatory agencies, has required those agencies to “consider 
cost—including, most importantly, cost of compliance, before deciding whether regulation 
is appropriate and necessary.” Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency, 135 S. Ct. 
2699, 2711 (2015); see also Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
                                                        
56 29 U.S.C. § 151 (identifying in its “findings and declaration of policy” of the NLRA the restoration of 
equal bargaining power between employers and employees as a purpose of the NLRA where unequal 
bargaining power prevents “the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and 
between industries”). 
57 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search for Bargaining 
Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 491-93 (1992) (arguing that measures to reduce strikes 
maximize welfare; Eric A. Posner, Four Economic Perspectives on American Labor Law and the Problem 
of Social Conflict, 159 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 101, 102-03, 106-07, 113-115 (2003) 
(arguing that labor law can promote conflict resolution and order). For case law emphasizing the purposes of 
industrial peace and the free flow of commerce, see, e.g., NLRB v. Fin. Inst. Emps. of Am., 475 U.S. 192, 208 
(1986) (stating that the Act’s basic purpose “is to preserve industrial peace”); First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. 
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981) (stating the Act’s fundamental aim as “the establishment and maintenance 
of industrial peace to preserve the flow of interstate commerce”). 
58 The behavioral economics literature has also highlighted the significance of workers’ perceptions of wage 
fairness—with respect to their own wage and with respect and relative to others’ wages working alongside 
them—on productivity and high-quality job performance. See, e.g., WEIL, supra note 6, at 81-83 
(summarizing behavioral economics literature); see also BEWLEY (explaining the existence of pay equity 
structures and nominal wage rigidity on fairness grounds); Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint 
on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 739-40 (1986) (finding that fairness 
constraints apply to wage-setting). 
59 As stated in Prof. Sanjukta Paul et. al.’s Comment to The Standard for Determining Joint-Employer 
Status (Dec. 13, 2018), the proposed joint-employer rule exacerbates the labor law’s conflict with the 
treatment of franchising arrangements under “single entity” or “integrated enterprise” doctrine under 
antitrust law. 
 16 
647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). While the state of the law is still unclear as to 
whether “consider[ing] cost” requires independent agencies to perform a full cost-benefit 
analysis, the Supreme Court has come a long way from Whitman v. American Trucking, 
531 U.S. 457 (2001), in its recent jurisprudence, holding that a statute that nowhere 
mentions costs “nonetheless requires consideration of costs—and requires that costs not 
significantly exceed benefits.”60  Further, administrative law scholars have argued that 
Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to conduct cost-benefit 
analysis absent explicit statutory language to the contrary in order to survive “arbitrary and 
capricious” review.61 
 
In its joint-employer NPRM, the Board identified the proposed rulemaking as “significant.” 
(See, e.g., p. 46695, column 3, paragraph 2). But, as discussed above, the Board has 
admitted that it has not engaged in economic analysis of its own because of the NLRA’s 
statutory ban on hiring individuals to conduct economic analysis. That fact, however, does 
not obviate the agency’s obligation to assess the costs of its NPRM relative to its benefits, 
beyond mere costs to small businesses and labor unions. 
 
Executive Order 13,725. Additionally, the joint-employer NPRM conflicts with 
Executive Order 13,725 (“EO 13,725”). EO 13,725 encourages agencies “with authorities 
that could be used to enhance competition” to “build upon efforts to detect abuses such 
as . . . anticompetitive behavior in labor and other input markets, exclusionary conduct, and 
blocking access to critical resources that are needed for competitive entry” (Section 2(b)). 
Section 1 of EO 13,725 identifies unlawful collusion over wages and wage-fixing as 
“stifl[ing] competition and erod[ing] the foundation of America’s economic vitality. The 
immediate results of such conduct—. . . less innovation, fewer new businesses being 
launched, and reduced opportunities for workers—can impact Americans in every walk of 
life.” The Order states as federal policy that agencies contribute to promoting competitive 
markets through “pro-competitive rulemaking and regulations, and by eliminating 
regulations that create barriers to or limit competition. Such Government-wide action is 
essential to ensuring that . . . workers . . . [and] small businesses . . . reap the full benefits 
of competitive markets.” (id.) 
 
Under Section 3(b) of EO 13,725, “[i]ndependent agencies are strongly encouraged to 
comply with the requirements of this order.” By ignoring economic theory and social 
scientific research on the consolidation and abuse of indirect employer market power over 
direct employers’ wage-setting—and even encouraging legal impunity for those indirect 
employers from labor law’s requirements—the joint-employer NPRM fails to comply with 
EO 13,725. In fact, by ignoring market power considerations in employer wage-setting, the 
Board—the only administrative agency tasked with regulating labor protections—removes 
from its scrutiny and analysis basic economic considerations of how labor markets work to 
determine wages and to impact the substance and efficacy of the NLRA’s labor rights 
                                                        
60 See Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 
972-76 (2018) (citing Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015)). 
61 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. ENVIR L. REV. 1, 3 
(2017). 
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protections. At the very least, the Board must explain why it failed to include franchisors 
that include no-poaching clauses in franchise agreements as “joint employers,” particularly 
in light of unrefuted and well-researched evidence of their prevalence.62 
 
6. The NLRB should take no action, letting the Browning-Ferris decision, 
recently affirmed by the D.C. Circuit, stand, or, in the alternative, the joint-
employer NPRM should incorporate employers with market power over 
workers’ wages and working conditions as “joint employers” under Section 
2(2) of the NLRA. 
 
The NLRB should take no action, letting the Browning-Ferris joint-employer standard, 
recently affirmed by the D.C. Circuit,63 stand, in order to include employers with indirect 
control over the “means or manner of employees’ work and terms of employment,” even 
if that control is limited and routine or not exercised.64 The scope of Browning-Ferris’s 
definition is sufficient to cover indirect employers with market power that engage in wage-
setting for direct employers’ employees, thus either directly determining labor input prices 
and direct employer compensation or impacting direct employers’ ability to fully 
compensate their direct employees due to artificially-suppressed contract pricing. 
 
Alternatively, indirect employers with sufficient market power—whether through 
unilateral acquisition and maintenance of monopsony power or through contractual 
agreements with direct employers, collusion, or oligopsonistic coordination—in the direct 
employer’s product market or the relevant labor market to determine workers’ wages 
and/or terms and conditions of work should be deemed “joint employers.”65 At the very 
least, the Board should expand its definition of “joint employer” to franchisors that include 
no-poaching clauses in franchise agreements: such blatant restrictions on labor market 
competition that limit worker earnings, mobility and wage discovery would clearly require 
a finding of joint-employer status.66 The NLRB can look to tests established by antitrust 
authorities to determine whether market power is sufficient to trigger “joint employer 
status.” For example, “sufficient market power” may be shown through direct or indirect 
evidence that the purported indirect employer faces an upward sloping supply curve—that 
the employer can profitably depress wages below prevailing market levels by withholding 
the purchase of labor inputs and not losing sellers of those inputs to other purchasers or 
employers.67 The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines 
treat the ability of an employer to profitably reduce payment for labor services by a small 
but significant nontransitory amount (usually 5%) as a key threshold for monopsony 
                                                        
62 Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 4. 
63 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., No. 16-1028, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 36706 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 2018) 
(holding as a matter of law that the “right-to-control element of the Board’s joint-employer standard has deep 
roots in the common law” and that “the common-law inquiry is not woodenly confined to indicia of direct 
and immediate control; an employer’s indirect control over employees can be a relevant consideration”). 
64 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. 186, 2, 15-16, 18-21 (2015). 
65 For an example of how to conduct analysis of market power in the context of indirect employers, see Hafiz, 
supra note 31, at 1901-06. 
66 See Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 4. 
67 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Samuel Muehlemann et 
al., Monopsony Power, Pay Structure, and Training, 66 ILR REV. 1097, 1097-99 (2013) (discussing direct 
and indirect evidence of monopsony power). 
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power.68 A similar threshold could be used to determine whether an indirect employer 
should be deemed a “joint employer.”  
 
Indirect employers’ market power could also be shown through evidence of that 
employer’s market share in a relevant geographic market for labor inputs protected by entry 
barriers.69 Courts have found a twenty percent market share to be sufficient to infer buyer 
market power over sellers of labor inputs.70 But recent empirical literature has shown that 
labor market concentration is much more prevalent than previously understood, and buyers 
of or contractors for labor inputs with much lower market shares can exert significant 
market power over sellers of those inputs.71  For example, high-volume retailers have 
tremendous leverage over suppliers, especially where the market for particular products is 
relatively small but benefits from resale in high-distribution, nationally-scaled businesses 
like Amazon.com or Wal-Mart are high.72 
 
Both the Browning-Ferris “joint employer” definition and the expanded market power 
definition are consistent with agency law standards under Section 2(2) as well as Supreme 
Court precedent on common law agency doctrine. 73  The Board concedes that the 
Browning-Ferris standard is consonant with common law agency doctrine and does not 
justify its rulemaking on grounds that Browning-Ferris contravenes that doctrine (p. 46686, 
column 1-2). Thus, for the reasons stated in the Browning-Ferris decision, including 
entities with indirect control over employers’ wages and working conditions is consistent 
with common law agency doctrine and the Restatement (Second) of Agency.74 
 
That same precedent also supports a definition of “joint employer” that includes those 
indirect employers with “sufficient market power” over a direct employees’ product market 
or the labor market for its inputs. First, federal courts recognize under “subservant” 
doctrine in cases incorporating the common-law standard for determining employment 
relationships that an employer’s control can be exercised indirectly in circumstances where 
a second employer directly controls the employee.75 The NLRB has also recognized that 
an indirect employer can have control over direct employers’ employees based on 
                                                        
68 DOJ and FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, §4.1.2 (“The Agencies most often use a SSNIP [small but 
significant and non-transitory increase in price] of five percent of the price paid by customers for the . . . 
services to which the merging firms contribute value.”). 
69 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam); I A.B.A, 
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (SIXTH) 229 (Jonathan M. Jacobson et al. eds., 6th ed. 2007). 
70 Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000). 
71 See Benmelech, Bergman & Kim, supra note 15; Maurice E. Stucke, Looking at the Monopsony in the 
Mirror, 62 EMORY L.J. 1509, 1538-39 (2013). 
72 Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 776-77 (6th Cir. 2002); Stucke, supra note 71, at 1538-
39; see also Barry C. Lynn, Breaking the Chain: The Antitrust Case Against Wal-Mart, HARPER’S MAG., 
July 2006, at 29, 29-36. 
73 See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964) (holding that a putative joint employer must 
“possess[] sufficient control over the work of the employees to qualify as a joint employer,” and stressing 
that the inquiry is not controlled by the fact that one putative employer is an independent contractor of 
another). 
74 Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. at 12-15. 
75 See, e.g., Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318, 325 (1974); Browning-Ferris, 2018 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 36706, at *45-46 & n.12; Schmidt v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., 605 F. 3d 686, 
689–690 (9th Cir. 2010); Allbritton Communications Co. v. NLRB, 766 F.2d. 812, 818–819 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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contracted-for labor input pricing that determines the direct employers’ compensation of 
its employees.76 Finally, the Restatement (Second) of Agency’s definition of “servant” 
under Section 220(1) is capacious enough to include those whose wages are set by an 
indirect employer because ability to determine wages is a standard means of control or 
right to control.77 Each example listed in the NPRM (p. 46697) as constituting a “joint 
employer” relationship is consistent with this revised definition of “joint employer,” and 
in each example where such a relationship is not found, the “sufficient market power” 
standard would not create one. This is because, in each of the examples, Company A is not 
free to set wages and benefits of its employees as it sees fit due to Company B’s market 
power over Company A’s product or relevant labor market. In fact, the NPRM’s “joint 
employer” definition would be more clearly described were it to incorporate such precise 
social scientific terminology.  
 
Further, compared to the NPRM’s “joint employer” definition, leaving the Browning-
Ferris decision in place or redefining the definition based on a “sufficient market power” 
standard is less costly on small businesses, labor organizations and workers because it 
would reduce inefficiencies created by indirect employer monopsony or oligopsony power  
and allow for the restoration of workers’ proper compensation, promote equal bargaining 
power between employees and their indirect employers, and thus allow them to effectively 
bargain collectively with both direct and indirect employers to lift artificially suppressed 
wages. 
 
7. Taking no action or expanding the definition of “joint employer” fulfills the 
NLRA’s purposes. 
 
Retaining the Browning-Ferris “joint employer” standard as affirmed by the D.C. Circuit 
or expanding the Board’s proposed rule to include as “joint employers” those with 
sufficient market power will foster predictability and consistency regarding determinations 
of joint-employer status, promoting labor-management stability. First, as to 
administrability, the existing Browning-Ferris or the proposed “market power” expansion 
to the Board’s new rule require less unpredictable balancing of vague factors, and the 
proposed expansion would allow review of direct and indirect evidence of indirect 
employers’ market power, a standard the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and 
the Federal Trade Commission are tasked with determining as a routine matter. At the very 
least, a social scientifically anchored way of determining agency under the common law 
fosters more predictability and consistency than that stated in the NPRM, which itself 
revives a standard that has not withstood consistent interpretation and leaves significant 
ambiguity as to its scope, applicability and relevance. As the above theoretical and 
empirical studies show, industrial organizations and labor economists have deployed 
                                                        
76 See, e.g.,Floyd Epperson, 202 NLRB 23 (1973) (finding that United had an indirect control over drivers’ 
wages because wage increases to a direct employer’s drivers came from raises given by United to the direct 
employer, a sole proprietor). 
77 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(l) (“A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs 
of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the 
other’s control or right to control.”); id. §§ 5, 5(2), comment e (recognizing the common law “subservant” 
doctrine and addressing cases in which one employer’s control is or may be exercised indirectly, while a 
second employer directly controls the employee). 
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economic methods to determine market power for decades, and using social scientific 
methods and evidence is more precise than ascertaining whether there is “substantial direct 
and immediate control” through increasingly complex employment arrangements within 
the restructured workplace. Thus, the Board’s assertion on p. 46686, column 2, paragraph 
2, that, “absent a requirement of proof of some ‘direct and immediate’ control to find a 
joint-employment relationship, it will be extremely difficult for the board to accurately 
police a line between independent commercial contractors and genuine joint employers” is 
incorrect. 
 
8. Taking no action or expanding the definition of “joint employers” is consistent 
with existing federal law and rules. 
 
Finally, the existing Browning-Ferris standard as affirmed by the D.C. Circuit, or, in the 
alternative, the “sufficient market power” test proposed herein, better accords with both 
administrative law requirements and Executive Order 13,725 because it would 
simultaneously align with maximizing the benefits and reducing the costs of labor 




The Board’s joint-employer NPRM should be withdrawn, or in the alternative, modified to 
include in its “joint employer” definition indirect employers with market power to 
determine direct employees’ wages and working conditions. 
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